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Abstract
This paper studies corporate risk management in a context with financial constraints
and imperfect competition on the product market. We show that the interactions between
firms heavily aﬀect their hedging demand. As a general rule, the firms’ hedging demand
decreases with the correlation between firms’ internal funds and investment opportunities.
We show that when the hedging demand of a firm is high in the case where investments are
strategic substitutes, its hedging demand is low in the case where investments are strategic
complements, and vice versa. Finally, we also propose another interpretation of our model
in terms of technical choice.
JEL Classification: G2, G3, D29
KEYWORDS: Hedging, Interactions between Firms, Credit Rationing
∗GREMAQ and LSE. I am largely indebted to Bruno Jullien (my supervisor) for his detailed comments on this
work and for his encouragements. Special thanks are due to Bruno Biais, Francois Boldron, Catherine Casamatta,
Arnold Chassagnon, Denis Gromb, Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Hela Hadj Ali, Armel Jacques, Felix Muennich, Pierre
Picard, Guillaume Plantin, Sebatien Pouget, Antoine Renucci, Sylvia Rosetto, Jean Tirole, Raoul Turtle, as well
as participants at the IDEI Finance work group on Corporate Finance and Industrial Organization and at the
Toulouse University young researchers seminar. I also would like to thank participants at the EEA meeting
(Bozen-Bolzano 2000), the EARIE meeting (Lausanne 2000), the EGRIE meeting (Rome 2000) and the “Ecole
de printemps” (Aix en Provence 2000). All remaining errors are mine.
1
1 Introduction
To a large extent, the study of corporate risk management has been conducted assuming that the
corporation is risk-averse. But, even if risk aversion can explain some hedging demand, it cannot
explain why shareholders who can diversify their own portfolio outside the firm choose a positive
hedging demand in a world with low individual transaction costs. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein
(1993), in a setting of risk-neutral agents and of imperfect financial markets, propose a model in
which the optimal risk management policy is aﬀected by future investment opportunities. Hedg-
ing activity is undertaken as a tool to coordinate corporate investments and financial policies.
In their empirical survey of the determinants of corporate hedging, Nance, Smith and Smithson
(1993), Ge´czy, Minton and Schrand (1997) report that firms with greater growth opportunities
and tighter financial constraints are more likely to hedge. This is in line with the previous pre-
diction. When firms interact in the product market, investment opportunities depend on their
competitors’ behavior. The main goal of this paper is to understand how the externalities be-
tween firms aﬀect their optimal hedging policy. We also propose some comparative statics for a
given hedging policy of the other competitor and at the equilibrium.
We consider a model with three dates: date 0, date 1 and date 2. At date 0, each firm
invests its initial endowment of cash in a risky project which generates a new risky amount
of cash at date 1. At date 1, we consider a duopoly framework in which firms face financial
constraints arising from a moral-hazard problem (see Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998)). In such
a model, a firm’s borrowing capacity is entirely determined by its internal funds. Here, these
internal funds correspond to the date 1 new amount of cash. Finally, at date 2 the returns of
the duopoly game of date 1 are realized. Date 1 new amount of cash is thus fundamental for
each firm, and in this paper we determine the firms’ optimal hedging policy of this date 1 new
amount of cash. We examine this question in three cases of particular interest. The first case is
when the risks which aﬀect the date 1 amount of cash of each firm are perfectly correlated. The
second case is when they are independent and the third case is when they are perfectly negatively
correlated. We conduct our analysis when firms’ investment are either strategic substitute or
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strategic complement.
In the case where investments are strategic substitutes, it is detrimental to a firm when the
other firm has a high date 1 amount of cash. That is, the higher is the other firm’s date 1 amount
of cash, the lower is the firm’s investment opportunities. Thus, when the risks are perfectly
correlated, the firms’ investment opportunities are higher when the firms’ date 1 amount of
cash are lower. Investment opportunities and date 1 amounts of cash are perfectly negatively
correlated. Consequently, the hedging demand is high. When the risks are independent, there
is no link between the investment opportunities and the firms’ date 1 amounts of cash. Thus,
the interactions between firms have no impact on their hedging demands. When the risks are
perfectly negatively correlated, the investment opportunities are the higher when the firms’ date
1 amounts of cash are the higher. The investment opportunities and the firms’ date 1 amounts
of cash are perfectly correlated. Thus, the firms’ hedging demand is low. Consequently, in the
substitute case, the firms’ hedging demand is higher when the risks are perfectly correlated than
when the risks are independent, and the lowest when the risks are perfectly negatively correlated.
In the case where investments are strategic complements, it is beneficial to one firm when
the other firm has a high date 1 amount of cash. That is, the higher is the other firm’s date 1
amount of cash, the higher is the firm’s investment opportunities. Therefore, and contrary to
the previous case, the firms’ hedging demand is higher when the risks are perfectly negatively
correlated than when the risks are independent, and the lowest when the risks are perfectly
correlated.
This paper is related to corporate risk management analysis and imperfect competition. It
is thereby connected to two strands of the literature:
In the Modigliani-Miller paradigm, hedging activities do not change the firm’s value. Since
1958, many contributions have found situations in which the Modigliani-Miller theorem does
not hold: in the presence of taxes, contracting costs, cost of bankruptcy or more generally
when capital market imperfections make externally obtained funds more expensive than those
generated internally.
Indeed a number of potential rationales for hedging have been put forward (e.g. Smith and
Stulz (1985) and Mayers and Smith (1982, 1987)). But these authors have focused on rationales
for hedging rather than on how much or what sort of hedging is optimal for a firm. Froot,
Scharfstein and Stein (1993) address this last question. They consider that external sources of
financing are more costly than internally generated funds. In this setting, by hedging the firm
can economize on future transaction costs. Then, they compute the optimal hedging strategy in
a way to coordinate investments and financial policies. Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1999) go in the
same direction. They show that firms should be isolated from all shocks that can be costlessly
hedged in markets in order to reduce variability in investment rules. Our paper still characterizes
the firms’ optimal hedging strategy but with a diﬀerent goal. We try to understand how the
optimal hedging strategy changes depending on the links between the risks borne by the firms
and on the interactions between firms.
A second strand of the literature tried to analyze what factors make a firm tougher or weaker
in response to an increase in a variable by the other firm (cf. Fudenberg-Tirole 1984). Bulow,
Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) have shown that it depends on the interactions between
firms. Our paper is closely connected to this literature because we show that the firms’ inter-
actions impact heavily on their hedging strategies. Indeed, the results found for the case where
investments are strategic substitutes are reversed when we consider the case where investments
are strategic complements.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model in terms of hedging
choice and propose another interpretation of it in terms of technical choice. Section 3 presents
the results for the substitute case (investments are strategic substitutes). Section 4 sketches the
results for the complement case (investments are strategic complements). Section 5 concludes
and mathematical proofs are in the appendix.
4
2 The model
The economy is composed by two types of agents: two firms (firms 1 and 2) and lenders. There
are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. All parties are risk neutral and protected by limited liability so that
no one can end up with a negative cash position.
To characterize the hedging demand, we consider that there is credit rationing on the credit
market at date 1. Another way to induce a hedging demand is to consider that there are
bankruptcy costs, convex tax functions or more generally, as in Froot et al (1993), to assume
that external sources of financing are more expensive than internal ones. In this paper, we choose
to link the hedging demand to an endogenous problem of credit rationing at date 1.
2.1 Date 0
2.1.1 The firms
At date 0, we assume that firms cannot raise external finance. Each firm i (with i = 1, 2) is
endowed with an initial amount of cash Ai0 and has the possibility to invest in a project which
yields a random return epi per unit of investment at date 1. We assume that epi which corresponds
to the spot price at date 1 of the firm i0s project of date 0, is equal to:
epi = a+ εi
where a is a constant and εi denotes a negative shock which follows a normal law. Finally, we
assume that the couple (ep1; ep2) follows a bivariate normal law with respective means Eep1, Eep2,
respective variance σ21, σ
2
2 and coeﬃcient of correlation ρ.
Firms are run by risk neutral entrepreneurs1 who have to simultaneously choose the optimal
hedging policy of the firm.2 Either the entrepreneur of firm i decides not to hedge and the return
is epi per unit of investment at date 1, or the entrepreneur prefers to hedge and the safe return
is p per unit of investment at date 1.3 We assume that the risk borne by the firm is not fully
1In this article, a firm corresponds to an entrepreneur. Therefore, we can equivalently deal with a firm or with
an entrepreneur.
2We focus on linear hedging strategies (for example forward sales) in this article.
3We implicitly assume that p > 1. Otherwise, the entrepreneur would prefer to keep cash from date 0 to date
1, rather than to hedge the result of the project of date 0.
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diversifiable and that hedging is costly. In other words and as a short cup, we assume that:
p < Eepi
As usual, Eepi − p is called the hedging risk premium.
We denote hi ∈ [0; 1] the level of hedging chosen by the entrepreneur of firm i. The return at
date 1 for firm i, Ai1 amounts to:
Ai1 = Ai0 (phi + (1− hi) epi) (1)
We assume that Ai0, epi and hi are observable.
Remark 1 At date 0, we assume that firms cannot raise external finance. This assumption is
without loss of generality in our setting. Even if firms were allowed to borrow at date 0 with the
intention of investing more than Ai0 in the project of date 0, the return at date 1 would still be
randomly distributed. Since we suppose that there is credit rationing at date 1, this possibility
would not change the hedging demand. Thus, to simplify, we consider that at date 0 it is not
possible to invest more than the endowment of cash Ai0 in the project.
The model of date 1 and 2 is an extension of the Holmstro¨m and Tirole’s continuous invest-
ment model (1998) (see also Tirole 1996).
2.2 Date 1
At date 1, we assume that firms can raise external finance from lenders.
2.2.1 The firms
At date 1, each firm has the possibility to invest in a new project. The project of date 1, if
undertaken, either succeeds or fails. The probability of success is denoted by P. If it succeeds
the project of date 1 yields a verifiable return which depends on the investments of both firms,
πi (Ii, Ij) at date 2. This function is assumed to be increasing and concave in Ii. In case of failure
the return is zero. The project is subject to moral hazard in the sense that the probability of
success depends on the behavior of the entrepreneur who runs the firm. The entrepreneur can
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behave or misbehave. Behaving yields a probability of success P = 1 and no private benefit
for the entrepreneur. On the other hand, misbehaving yields a smaller probability of success
P = PL < 1, but the entrepreneur receives a private benefit proportional to the investment,
BIi > 0.
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To capture the idea of credit rationing, we assume that the marginal revenue of the project
is always higher than 1. This means that without any constraint the entrepreneur would like
to invest an infinite level. At date 1, the entrepreneur of firm i is endowed with the amount
Ai1 of cash (see eq (1)). Thus, since he wants to invest an infinite level he has to borrow from
lenders. The problem of credit rationing arises from the moral hazard problem. We assume that
the project’s net present value is positive only if the entrepreneur behaves:
πi (Ii, Ij)− Ii > 0 > PLπi (Ii, Ij) +BIi − Ii
Therefore, a loan agreement must be careful to preserve enough of a stake for the entrepreneur
in the project so that he prefers to behave.5 This is precisely because the entrepreneur has to
receive incentives so as to behave that he is not able to invest an infinite level in the project of
date 1.6
2.2.2 The lenders
Lenders behave competitively in the sense that the loan, if any, makes zero profit. That is, we
consider that several prospective lenders compete for issuing a loan to the borrower, and that if
the most attractive loan oﬀer made a positive profit, the borrower could turn to an alternative
lender and oﬀer to switch for a slightly lower interest rate. We use the plural “lenders” even
though a single lender may turn out to finance the entire loan, because lending is a passive and
anonymous activity in this article.
Let us now determine the date 1 optimal loan contract.
4Another interpretation of B is in terms of eﬀort. B then, represents the disutility of eﬀort saved by the
entrepreneur when he misbehaves.
5Since entrepreneurs are protected by limited liability, “preserve enough of the stake for the entrepreneur”
them requires the design of an incentive mechanism. Indeed, even if the project fails, which perfectly reveals that
the entrepreneur was mishaving, the latter cannot be hanged or sent to jail.
6See below for more details on that point.
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2.2.3 The date1 optimal loan contract
The contract between the lender and the entrepreneur is a revenue sharing rule specifying what
fraction of the revenue accrues to each party in the two states of the world. The entrepreneur
receives Rbi and lenders: πi (Ii, Ij) − Rbi. A financing contract at date 1 is then defined by the
couple (Rbi; Ii) .
Since the project has a positive NPV only if the entrepreneur behaves, the contract should
provide him the incentives to do so.
The maximization problem of the entrepreneur can be written as follows
max
Rbi
Rbi −Ai1
st



πi (Ii, Ij)−Rbi ≥ Ii −Ai1 (IRi)l
Rbi ≥
BIi
1− PL
(ICi)b
Because lenders are competitive, their participation constraint is binding. Consequently, the
entrepreneur receives the entire social surplus of the project. He wants to invest an infinite level
since we assumed that the marginal revenue of the project is always higher than 1. But, because
his incentive compatibility constraint must be satisfied, his investment is limited. Therefore, to
maximize the level of investment and his expected revenue, the entrepreneur chooses to bind his
incentive compatibility constraint, (ICi)b .
The second best investment level of each firm is given by the following system of two implicit
equations



π1 (I1, I2)− I1 =
BI1
1− PL
−A11
π2 (I1, I2)− I2 =
BI2
1− PL
−A21
Each investment level is a function of the date 1 amounts of cash, denoted Ii (Ai1, Aj1). The
characterization of the investment level is illustrated in figure 1.
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2.3 Date 2
The returns of the project of date 1 are realized, and claims are settled between firms and lenders.
The timing is summarized just below.
0iA
0jA 1jA
1iA iI
jI
C h o i c e  o f  : R e s u l t :ji hh ;
D a t e  0 D a t e  2
F i n a n c i n g  C o n t r a c t
M o r a l  h a z a r d
S u c c e s s  o r
F a i l u r e
D a t e  1
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In this model, the investment of one firm depends on his date 1 amount of cash. Thus, we
define a value function for each firm which depends on the date 1 amount of cash of both firms
Vi (Ai1;Aj1) which we will use in the rest of the paper.
Definition 1 We define the value function Vi (Ai1;Aj1) by:
Vi (Ai1;Aj1) : IR
2 → IR twice continuously diﬀerentiable
such that Vi (Ai1;Aj1) ≡ πi (Ii (Ai1, Aj1) , Ij (Ai1, Aj1))− Ii (Ai1, Aj1) .
The value function Vi (Ai1;Aj1) depends on the date 1 competition between firms. But Ai1
and Aj1 are not the strategic variables. The strategic variables are the levels of investment Ii and
Ij. The following proposition makes a link with the traditional definition introduced by Bulow
et al (1985) of strategic substitutes vs strategic complements:
Let πi (Ii, Ij) be the firm i’s profit function and Ii its strategic variable.
On the one hand, if a marginal increase in the firm j’s strategic variable (Ij) decreases the
firm i’s marginal profit
µ
∂2πi (Ii, Ij)
∂Ii∂Ij
< 0
¶
we say that Ii and Ij are strategic substitutes.
On the other hand, if a marginal increase in the firm j’s strategic variable (Ij) increases the
firm i’s marginal profit
µ
∂2πi (Ii, Ij)
∂Ii∂Ij
> 0
¶
we say that Ii and Ij are strategic complements.
Proposition 1 For
∂2πj
∂Ij∂Ii
, ∂
2πi
∂I2j
, ∂
2πi
∂Ij∂Ii
,
∂2πj
∂I2j
,
∂2πj
∂I2i
bounded and
∂πj
∂Ii
, ∂πi
∂Ij
suﬃciently low, we have:
- Vi (Ai1;Aj1) increasing and concave in Ai1
- if Ii and Ij are strategic substitutes, then
∂2Vi(Ai1;Aj1)
∂Ai1∂Aj1
< 0
- if Ii and Ij are strategic complements, then
∂2Vi(Ai1;Aj1)
∂Ai1∂Aj1
> 0
Proof. see appendix 1
For mathematical convenience, in the rest of the article, we restrict ourselves to the case where
the value function Vi (Ai1;Aj1) is quadratic. This case represents a second order approximation
of all other functions.
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2.4 The production choice interpretation
Our framework can also be applied to firms facing a production rather than an hedging choice.
Ai0 is then a stock of intermediate goods. Date 0 is an intermediate date during which the final
good is produced. Each firm can choose between two technological processes to produce its final
good. The first technology is risky. It yields a random production eqi per unit of investment at
date 1. The second technology is not risky and yields a safe production q per unit of investment.
Moreover and as above, we assume that
q < Eeqi
Denoting by hi the firm i’s safe production level, the quantity of final good at date 1 Ai1 can
be written
Ai1 = Ai0 (qhi + (1− hi) eqi)
At date 1 a diﬀerentiated product Cournot game is played. Both firms sell their production
Ai1 on the same market. Finally, profits are realized at date 2. Consequently, the firm i
0s profit
function can be written as follows:
πi (Ai1, Aj1) = Π (Ai1 +Aj1)Ai1
where Π (Ai1 +Aj1) is the inverse demand function
Thus here, we define the value function Vi (Ai1;Aj1) by:
Vi (Ai1;Aj1) : IR
2 → IR twice continuously diﬀerentiable
such that Vi (Ai1;Aj1) ≡ Π (Ai1 +Aj1)Ai1
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The timing is as described below
0iA
0jA
1ii Aq =
1jj Aq =
C h o i c e  o f  : ji hh ;
P r o d u c t i o n  p e r i o d
D a t e  2
S t o c k  o f  i n t e r m e d i a t e  g o o d s
F i n a l  g o o d
P r o f i t  o f
e a c h  f i r m
D a t e  1 :  C o u r n o t  g a m eD a t e  0
We assume that Vi (Ai1, Aj1) is increasing and concave in Ai1. We also restrict ourselves to the
case where the value function Vi (Ai1;Aj1) is quadratic. Here, this case can exactly be generated,
if we consider a diﬀerentiated products Cournot model with linear demand functions. Finally,
we define strategic substitutability vs strategic complementarity in the usual way as described
above. We can note that in the production choice interpretation, Ai1 and Aj1 are the strategic
variables. Thus, we do not need to make a statement similar to proposition 1.
To fix ideas we deal only with the hedging interpretation in the rest of the paper. The
production interpretation can equivalently be made simply by interpreting hi as the firm i’s date
0 safe production level rather than as the firm i’s date 0 hedging level.
3 Optimal hedging strategies
As we said above, in the hedging interpretation the strategic variables are the levels of investment
Ii and Ij and not the firms’ date 1 amount of cash. Thus, on the one hand, we refer to the
substitute case if the firm i0s marginal value of date 1 is decreasing with respect to the firm j’s
date 1 amount of cash. On the other hand, if the firm i0s marginal value of date 1 is increasing
with respect to the firm j’s date 1 amount of cash, we speak about the complement case.
We concentrate ourselves on three particular cases. The first case is when the shocks which
aﬀect the spot prices ep1 and ep2 are perfectly correlated (ρ = 1) .We call this case the aggregated
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shocks case. For example, we could think about a raw materials shock for two firms inside the
same industry as in Shleifer and Vishny (1992).7 The second is when the shocks which aﬀect the
spot prices are independent (ρ = 0). We call this case the independent shocks case. For example,
we could consider a fire risk for two firms geographically distant one from the other. Finally,
the last case we consider is when the shocks which aﬀect the spot prices are perfectly negatively
correlated (ρ = −1). This last case is called, the perfectly negatively correlated shocks case. For
instance, we could consider a shock on the consumers’ preferences which shifts demand from one
firm to the other.
At date 0, the entrepreneur of firm i chooses the optimal hedging level h∗i which maximize
the firm i’s date 1 expected value under two constraints which indicate how the firms’ date 1
amounts of cash depend on their date 0 hedging choices
h∗i ∈ argmax
hi
EVi (Ai1, Aj1)
st
½
Ai1 = Ai0 (phi + (1− hi) epi)
Aj1 = Aj0 (phj + (1− hj) epj)
To derive the optimal hedging strategies, we compute the first order condition of the above
program and we apply the Rubinstein (1976) rule. The calculations are detailed in appendix 2.
Finally we find:
−cov
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
; epi¶ = E · ∂Vi∂Ai1
¸
(Eepi − p)
where “cov” corresponds to the covariance of two random variables.
This condition indicates that the optimal hedging level restricts the covariance between the
marginal value function and the random variable epi to a precise value. This value corresponds
to the average of the marginal value function, multiplied by the risk premium.
Remark 2 The optimal hedging level would insulate the marginal value function of Vi
³
∂Vi
∂Ai1
´
,
from fluctuations in the random variable epi if there were no risk premium (like in the paper of
7example: the oil shock in 1973 for oil companies.
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Froot et al (1993)). Notice that it is not necessarily the same as insulating the total value of the
firm (Vi).
We can already notice that if the marginal value function of Vi was independent of epi (Vi
linear), the first order condition indicates that hi would be equal to 0, since we do not permit
short sales.
On the other hand, if the covariance between the marginal value of Vi and epi is very highµ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
very high
¶
, the first order condition indicates that hi would tend to 1.
We find the following expression for the reaction function hi (hj) . hi (hj) corresponds to firm
i’s chosen hedging level, for a given firm j’s hedging level.
Lemma 1 For ρ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} we have :
hi(hj) = 1+
ρ
Aj0
Ai0
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶ σj
σi
(1− hj)
| {z }
term 1
+
1
Ai0
E
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶Eepi − p
σ2i| {z }
term 2
Proof. see appendix 2
The reaction functions are composed of two terms.
The first term reflects the interactions between the two firms. The sign of the interactions
depends on the sign of the cross derivative
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
. This term corresponds to the expression
which minimizes the “firm i’s date 1 amount of cash balanced variance” (see appendix 3 for a
proof). We call this term the interaction eﬀect.
Thus, when firm i’s value function depends on what firm(s) j does (do), like in the duopolistic
or more generally in the oligopolistic case, the nature of the links between firms is an important
element of the hedging demand.
The second term expresses the trade oﬀ between the risk premium and the insurance demand
due to the concavity of the value function Vi. This term depends neither on the cross derivative
of the value function nor on the correlation coeﬃcient.8 The higher is the risk premium, the
8In the finance literature, this term is called the speculative demand.
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lower is the hedging demand. If there is no risk premium, this term disappears. On the other
hand, the hedging demand increases with the concavity of the value function Vi. We call this
term the risk premium eﬀect. Moreover, as a benchmark we can notice that in the case of a
monopoly, only this eﬀect would matter since the interaction eﬀect would disappear.
For reading convenience, we are going to analyze the substitutes case. We deal with the
complement case in a complementary section.9
3.1 The substitute case
In such a case, at date 1 it is detrimental to one firm (for example for firm i) when the date 1
amount of cash of its rival firm (firm j) is high. This is summed up in the fact that the cross
derivative of the value function ∂
2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
is negative. The sign taken by the interaction eﬀect
depends on the correlation between shocks which aﬀect the return of projects of date 0.
Proposition 2 For a given firm j0s hedging level hj, the firm i0s hedging level is higher in the
Aggregated Schocks Case than in the Independent Shocks Case which itself is higher than in
the Perfectly Negatively Correlated Shocks Case, that is
haggregated shocksi ≥ h
independent shocks
i ≥ h
perfectly negatively correlated shocks
i
Proof. See appendix 4
3.1.1 Aggregated shocks
Since shocks are aggregated (ρ = 1) , the firm i’s date 1 amount of cash is high (low) when the
firm j’s date 1 amount of cash is also high (low). But, in the substitute case it is detrimental
to firm i when the firm j0s date 1 amount of cash is high. This means that when the firm i0s
date 1 amount of cash is the lowest, its expected marginal value (what we will call its investment
opportunities from now) is the highest. Firm i’s date 1 amount of cash is perfectly negatively
9Remark about the production choice interpretation:
Traditionally in a Cournot game, the strategic variables are taken to be strategic substitutes, but there are
cases where strategic variables are strategic complements (cf Bulow et al 1985).
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correlated with its investment opportunities. This eﬀect tends to increase the hedging demand
and explains why the interaction eﬀect is positive.
This case turns out to be the one where the hedging demand is the highest.
3.1.2 Independent shocks
In that case, there is no particular link between the firms’ date 1 amount of cash and their
investment opportunities. This is why the interaction eﬀect is equal to 0.
Only the risk premium eﬀect impacts the hedging demand.
3.1.3 Perfectly negatively correlated shocks
This case constitutes the opposite to the aggregated shocks case. When the firm i0s date 1
amount of cash is high, the firm j0s date 1 amount of cash is low. This means that the firm
i0s date 1 amount of cash and its investment opportunities are perfectly correlated. This eﬀect
tends to lower the hedging demand and explains why the interaction eﬀect is negative.
This case turns out to be the one where the hedging demand is the lowest.
First results of comparative statics
Suppose that firm j is not subject to credit rationing. In that case, its hedging policy can
result from others reasons like expected taxes or bankruptcy costs reduction. Such results of
comparative statics are important since they indicate how some changes impact firm i’s hedging
policy which is driven by the problem of credit rationing, when firm j’s hedging policy is driven
by other reasons.
1. When the variance of the spot price σ2i increases
Traditionally in the literature, the hedging demand is increasing with respect to the variance
of the spot price epi, here σ2i for firm i. Is it true in this model?
First, consider the direct eﬀect of the variance σ2i on firm i’s interaction eﬀect. When σ
2
i
increases, firm i’s interaction eﬀect decreases in absolute value, except for ρ = 0 since the
interaction eﬀect does not exist. Therefore, in the aggregated shocks case, this marginal
eﬀect is negative whereas it is positive in the perfectly negatively correlated shocks case.
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Finally, consider the eﬀect of σ2i on the risk premium eﬀect. This eﬀect corresponds to the
traditional eﬀect, often considered in the literature, of the variance on the hedging demand.
The sign of this term is positive. When σ2i increases this marginal eﬀect tends to increase
the hedging demand due to the concavity of the value function.
Therefore, the eﬀect of σ2i on hi is not clear.
10 To sum up, consider the following board.
Marginal eﬀect
of σ2i on the firm i’s
interaction eﬀect
Marginal eﬀect of σ2i
on the firm i’s risk
premium eﬀect
Global eﬀect
of σ2i on hi
ρ = 1 <0 >0 ?
ρ = 0 =0 >0 >0
ρ = −1 >0 >0 >0
2. When the firm i’s date 0 amount of cash Ai0 increases
When the firm i’s date 0 amount of cash Ai0 increases, the interaction eﬀect is reduced
in absolute value. When Ai0 increases, Ai1 increases on average. On average the firm i’s
investment opportunities decreases since the value function is concave in Ai1 (
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
< 0)
which reduces the interaction eﬀect.
When Ai0 increases, the risk premium eﬀect decreases in absolute value which increases
the level of hedging. It becomes more and more costly in term of risk, not to hedge the
return of the project of date 0.11
Finally, when shocks are independent or perfectly negatively correlated, the hedging de-
mand increases. When shocks are aggregated, the interaction eﬀect decreases which tend
to reduce the hedging demand, but the risk premium eﬀect increases which goes on the
other direction.
10We can note that there is also an indirect eﬀect of σ2i on the firm i’s interaction eﬀect which corresponds
to the indirect eﬀect of σ2i on hj times the eﬀect of hj on hi. We can proove, due to the computations of the
following section, that it is negative when shocks are aggregated. It does not exist when they are independent
and finally it can be negative or positive when they are perfectly negatively correlated.
11This result comes from the specification of the value function which is taken to be quadratic.
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3. When the firm j’s date 0 amount of cash Aj0 increases
When the date 0 amount of cash of the other firm Aj0 increases, the interaction eﬀect
increases in absolute value. When Aj0 increases, on average Aj1 increases. Thus, on
average the impact of firm j on the firm i’s investment opportunities increases.
Moreover, when Aj0 increases the risk premium eﬀect decreases in absolute value which
increases the level of hedging. When Aj0 increases, Aj1 increases on average. Thus, the firm
i’s investment opportunities decrease on average
³
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
< 0
´
. Since the value function
of firm i is concave, he chooses to go to a safer position.
Therefore, when shocks are aggregated or independent, the chosen hedging level increases
with Aj0. But when shocks are perfectly negatively correlated, the interaction eﬀect de-
creases which tend to reduce the hedging demand, but the risk premium eﬀect increases
which goes on the other direction.
4. When the private benefit B of date 1 of the entrepreneur of firm i increases
We have to remember that at the optimum, we have the following relation
∂Vi
∂Ai1
=
B
∆P
∂Ii
∂Ai1
− 1
Therefore, the eﬀect of the private benefit B on the hedging demand corresponds only
to the eﬀect of B on the risk premium eﬀect. When the private benefit B increases, the
investment opportunities
³
∂Vi
∂Ai1
´
increases at the optimum (for example you can see that
on the figure 1). Thus, when B increases, it is more and more costly for the entrepreneur
to hedge the return of the project of date 0. Thus, when B increases, the entrepreneur
chooses a riskier position.
For a detailed proof of the four points, see appendix 5.
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3.2 The Symmetric Nash Equilibria
Before characterizing the symmetric Nash equilibria, we study the evolution of firm i’s hedging
demand with respect to the firm j’s hedging level.
Lemma 2 For ρ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} we have:
∂hi (hj)
∂hj
Ã
1 +
(Eepi − p)2
σ2i
!
=
−ρAj0
Ai0
E
³
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
´
E
³
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
´ σj
σi| {z }
term 1
− Aj0
Ai0
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
¶
E
³
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
´ 1
σi
(Eepi − p) (Eepj − p)
σi| {z }
term 2
Proof. see appendix 6
The expression of
∂hi
∂hj
is composed of two terms. The first one represents the marginal
interaction eﬀect of the hedging demand function. The second term characterizes the marginal
risk premium eﬀect. The sign of these marginal eﬀects depends on the sign of the cross derivative
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
, that is, on the nature of the interactions between firm i and firm j.
Proposition 3 For the aggregated shocks case, the marginal interaction eﬀect and the marginal
risk premium eﬀect have the same sign. This sign is negative. For the independent shocks case
only the marginal risk premium eﬀect exists. Thus, we have:
hi is decreasing in hj
For the perfectly negatively correlated shocks case, the two marginal eﬀects are opposite in
sign. Thus, hi can be decreasing or increasing. More precisely we have:
if (Eepi − p) (Eepj − p) > −cov (epi, epj) hi is decreasing in hj
if (Eepi − p) (Eepj − p) < −cov (epi, epj) hi is increasing in hj
When hj increases, Aj1 decreases on average. Thus, firm i’s investment opportunities increase
on average since we are in the substitute case. Thus, it becomes more and more costly for firm
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i to hedge the return of its project of date 0 when hj increases. Note that this is all the more
costly than the risk premium is high. Consequently, the risk premium eﬀect (the speculative
demand) decreases. The sign of the marginal risk premium eﬀect is always negative.
The sign of the marginal interaction eﬀect depends on which shocks we consider. When the
shocks are aggregated, this marginal eﬀect is negative. When firm j’s hedging level increases,
firm i’s date 1 amount of cash and its investment opportunities become less and less negatively
correlated. Thus, this marginal eﬀect tends to decrease hi.
When the shocks are independent, this marginal eﬀect does not exist.
When the shocks are perfectly negatively correlated, this marginal eﬀect is positive. In that
case, when hj increases, firm i’s date 1 amount of cash and its investment opportunities become
less and less positively correlated. This marginal eﬀect tends to increase hi. Consequently, the
overall impact when the shocks are perfectly negatively correlated depends on which marginal
eﬀect is greater. If the marginal risk premium eﬀect is higher in absolute value (lower) than the
marginal interaction eﬀect, then the sign of
∂hi
∂hj
is negative (positive).
For what follows we focus on the case of symmetric firms.
Assumption 1: (A1) Firm i and firm j are symmetric if
A10 = A20
σ1 = σ2
Eep1 = Eep2
V1 (A11, A21) = V2 (A11, A21)
Assumption 2: (A2) We make the assumption that
¯¯¯¯
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
¶¯¯¯¯
<
¯¯¯¯
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶¯¯¯¯
This second assumption corresponds to a stability condition as shown in remark 3 below. For
reading convenience, let denote h∗ρ the equilibrium level of hedging for a correlation coeﬃcient
ρ.12
Proposition 4 Under A1 and A2, there is an unique Nash equilibrium for each case. It is
symmetric and stable. Moreover, if we compare the Nash equilibria we obtain the following
12Consequently, h∗1 is the hedging equilibrium level for the aggregated shocks case. h
∗
0 is the hedging equilibrium
level for the independent shocks case. Finally, h∗−1 is the hedging equilibrium level for the perfectly negatively
correlated shocks case.
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ranking:
h∗1 > h
∗
0 > h
∗
−1
That is, the level of hedging h∗ is increasing with the correlation coeﬃcient of the shocks ρ.
Proof. We have:
• ∂hi
∂hj
≤ 0 for the aggregated and independent shocks cases.
• for the perfectly negatively correlated shocks case, ∂hi
∂hj
could be negative or positive.
• haggregated shocksi (0) > hindependent shocksi (0) > hperfectly negatively correlated shocksi (0)
• haggregated shocksi (1) = hindependent shocksi (1) = hperfectly negatively correlated shocksi (1) < 1
• the reaction functions are linear
We distinguish two cases:
First case:
∂hi
∂hj
≤ 0 ∀ρ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
As shown in figure 2, the symmetric Nash equilibria are unique and respect proposition 4
ih
jh
L e g e n d :
                             a g g r e g a te d  s h o c k s  c a s e  ’ s  r e a c t io n  f u n c t io n
                           in d e p e n d e n t  s h o c k s  c a s e  ’ s  r e a c t io n  f u n c t io n
p e r f e c t ly  in v e r s e ly  c o r r e la te d  s h o c k s  c a s e  ’ s  r e a c t io n  f u n c t io n
F ig u r e  2
1
1
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Second case:
∂hi
∂hj
≤ 0 for aggregated and independent shocks but ∂hi
∂hj
≥ 0 for perfectly
negatively correlated shocks case.
jh
ih
F i g u r e  2  b i s
1
1
As shown in figure 2 bis, the symmetric Nash equilibria are unique and respect proposition
4
Remark 3 When assumption 2 does not hold, there may exist several Nash equilibria in the
game. The following details could be skipped in a first reading.
Consider first the aggregated shocks case. Without assumption 2 we could have multiplicity
of Nash equilibria, as depicted in the following figure.
ih
jh
1NE23      ji hh     ij
Here, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is not the only Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the
symmetric Nash equilibrium is not stable in a standard tatonnement process.13 There are two
stable asymmetric equilibria in which one firm is fully hedged (hi = 1). This case emerges for
instance for a small risk premium but for a high interaction eﬀect.
In all cases where
∂hi
∂hj
≤ 0, we could have several Nash equilibria as depicted in the figure just
below. There are two stable asymmetric equilibria in which one firm is not hedged at all (hi = 0).
This case emerges for very high risk premiums. Here again, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is
not stable.
ih
jh
1NE
2NE
3NE
1
1
( )ji hh
( )ij hh
Thus, for all these cases assumption 2 which permits the symmetric Nash equilibrium to be
the unique Nash equilibrium, corresponds to a stability condition.
Finally, consider the perfectly negatively correlated shocks case, when
∂hi
∂hj
≥ 0. In that case,
there is always a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (remember that h−1 (0) < 1), which may
correspond to no hedging at all, if the risk premium is very high.
The ranking of the diﬀerent hedging levels is still the same at the equilibrium. This comes
from the fact that, at the equilibrium, the hedging levels are not equal to one because of the
risk premium. Thus, the interaction eﬀect exists and it implies this ranking. Following the
13Definition of a standard tatonnement process: for a slight exogenous increase in hi, we compute the
change it induces in the equilibrium best response of firm j, that is, in the partial equilibrium of firm j taking the
new hedging level of firm i as given. Then, we compute firm i’s own best response. If this best response is not
closer than the exogenous initial disturbance to the equilibrium value, the equilibrium is not stable. On the other
hand, if this best response is closer than the exogenous initial change to the equilibrium value, the equilibrium is
stable.
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terminology of Froot et al (1993), we could speak of changing investment opportunities to explain
the diﬀerences between the optimal hedging strategies. Our results corroborate their results, but
we endogenized the changing investment opportunities in terms of interactions between firms.
Moreover, we went one step further by going to the Nash equilibrium.
We now study the impact of various changes in the environment on the characteristics of the
Nash equilibria.
3.2.1 Increasing the risk premium (for symmetric firms)
Consider first the impact of an increase in the risk premium (Eep− p), when the value function
Vi does not change.
By using the implicit function theorem, we have:
dhi
d(Eep− p) =
1
σ2
·
E
∂Vi
∂Ai1
1
Ai0
− hi
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
+
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
¶
(Eep− p)¸·
E
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
µ
1 +
(Eep− p)2
σ2i
¶
+ E
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
µ
ρ+
(Eep− p)2
σ2i
¶¸ < 0
Thus, the hedging demand clearly decreases when the risk premium increases. This eﬀect
is unambiguous. If the risk premium increases and the value function Vi stays the same, the
trade-oﬀ between the two goes toward a riskier position.
3.2.2 Increasing the interactions between firms
Consider finally an increase in the interactions between firms. That means increasing
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
while keeping
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
constant. Here too, this eﬀect is unambiguous. If
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
increases and
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
is constant, the interaction eﬀect of firm i’s hedging demand increases in absolute value.
Thus, firm i’s reaction function shifts upward for the aggregated shocks case and downward for
the perfectly negatively correlated shocks case. For the independent shocks case, firm i’s reaction
function does not change since the first term we are talking about does not then exist.
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The changes are described in the following figures
ih
jh
jh
ih
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                           i n d e p e n d e n t  s h o c k s  c a s e  ’ s    r e a c t i o n   f u n c t i o n
 p e r f e c t l y  i n v e r s e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  s h o c k s  c a s e  ’ s  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n
1
1
1
1
N E N E  ’
Consequently, for a given risk premium level, the higher are the interactions between firms,
the higher are the diﬀerences between the equilibrium hedging levels.
4 Complementary section: the complement case
This section follows the study done above for the other case we are interested in, that is, for the
complement case. Here, we consider that the cross derivative ∂
2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
is positive. This means
that it is beneficial for firm i when firm j0s date 1 amount of cash is high. Firm i’s marginal
value is increasing with respect to firm j’s date 1 amount of cash. Consequently, the sign of the
interaction eﬀect defined in lemma 1 is the opposite of the sign obtained for the substitute case.
In the aggregated shocks case this sign is negative and in the perfectly negatively correlated
shocks case it is positive. As before, in the independent shocks case this term does not exist.
Thus, the results corresponding to this case are reversed with respect to the substitute case.
Proposition 5 For a given firm j0s hedging level hj, the firm i0s hedging level is higher in the
Perfectly Negatively Correlated Shocks Case than in the Independent Shocks Case which itself
is higher than in the Aggregated Shocks Case, that is
haggregated shocksi ≤ h
independent shocks
i ≤ h
perfectly negatively correlated shocks
i
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Proof. We follow exactly the same method as for the proof of proposition 2, but the result
is reversed because the sign of the cross derivative is positive and not negative.
Firm i’s hedging demand is the lowest in the aggregated shocks case because its date 1
amount of cash is perfectly correlated with its investment opportunities. Conversely, firm i’s
hedging demand is the highest in the perfectly negatively correlated shocks case because then,
its date 1 amount of cash is perfectly negatively correlated with its investment opportunities.
Results of comparative statics
1. When the variance of the spot price σ2i increases
The marginal eﬀect of σ2i on the risk premium eﬀect is still the same. Moreover, when σ
2
i
increases, firm i’s interaction eﬀect also still decreases in absolute value. In the complement
case, this means that in the aggregated shocks case the direct marginal eﬀect of σ2i on firm
i’s interaction eﬀect is positive, while for the perfectly negatively correlated shocks it is
negative. In the complement case, the eﬀect of σ2i on hi is not clear when shocks are
perfectly negatively correlated.
2. When the firm i’s date 0 amount of cash Ai0 increases
On the one hand, when the firm j0s date 0 amount of cash Aj0 increases, the interaction
eﬀect decreases in absolute value. This tends to increase the hedging demand in the
aggregated shocks case and to decrease it in the perfectly negatively correlated shocks
case.
On the other hand, the eﬀect of Aj0 on the risk premium eﬀect is still the same. This eﬀect
decreases in absolute value which increases the level of hedging.
The eﬀect of an increase of Ai0 on hi is also not clear in the perfectly negatively correlated
shocks case.
26
3. When the firm j’s date 0 amount of cash Aj0 increases
On the one hand, when the firm j0s date 0 amount of cash Aj0 increases, the interaction
eﬀect increases in absolute value. This tends to decrease the hedging demand in the
aggregated shocks case and to increase it in the perfectly negatively correlated shocks case.
On the other hand, when Aj0 increases, the risk premium eﬀect increases in absolute value
which decreases the level of hedging. When Aj0 increases, Aj1 increases on average. Thus,
on average the firm i’s investment opportunities increases. Thus, it is more and more costly
for firm i to hedge the return of its project of date 0.
Therefore, the eﬀect of an increase of Aj0 on hi is once again not clear in the perfectly
negatively correlated shocks case.
The analysis with respect to the private benefit B is exactly the same as in the substitute
case.
For more details, see appendix 5.
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4.1 The Symmetric Nash Equilibria
Lemma 2 tells us that the signs of the slopes of firm i’s reaction functions are reversed in the
complement case with respect to the substitute case. The demonstrations are also reversed.
Proposition 6 For the aggregated shocks case, the marginal interaction eﬀect and the marginal
risk premium eﬀect are both positive. For the independent shocks case only the risk premium
eﬀect exists. Thus, we have:
hi is increasing in hj
For the perfectly negatively correlated shocks case, the two marginal eﬀects are opposite in
sign. Thus, hi can be decreasing or increasing. More precisely we have:
if (Eepi − p) (Eepj − p) > −cov (epi, epj) hi is increasing in hj
if (Eepi − p) (Eepj − p) < −cov (epi, epj) hi is decreasing in hj
This proposition is illustrated in the following two figures:
ih
jh jh
ih
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                          in d e p e n d e n t  s h o c k s  c a s e  ’ s  r e a c t io n  fu n c tio n
p e r fe c t ly  in v e r s e ly  c o r re la te d  s h o c k s  c a s e  ’ s  r e a c t io n  fu n c tio n
F ig u re  3 a F ig u re  3 b
1
1
1
1
T h e  c o m p le m e n t
c a s e
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Proposition 7 Under A1 and A2, there is an unique Nash equilibrium for each case. It is
symmetric and stable. Moreover, if we compare the Nash equilibria, we obtain the following
ranking:
h∗1 < h
∗
0 < h
∗
−1
That is, the level of hedging h∗ is decreasing with the correlation coeﬃcient of the shocks ρ.
Proof. The demonstration follows step by step the demonstration of proposition 4. For the
details see appendix 7.
As above, the same remark concerning the role of assumption 2 could be made for this case.
As in the first case we can do comparative statics. The results are the same as in the first
case:
1. If the risk premium increases, the entrepreneurs choose lower hedging levels.
2. Besides, for a given risk premium level, the higher are the interactions between firms, the
higher are the diﬀerences between the equilibrium hedging levels.
5 Link with the hedging literature and conclusion
5.1 Link with the hedging literature
First of all, according to the Modigliani-Miller paradigm, we know that hedging activities do not
change the firm’s value. In the Arrow-Debreu model, the corner stone of modern finance, capital
structure is irrelevant, as cited in Holmstro¨m-Tirole 1999. Any theory of corporate finance must
be grounded in some deviation from the assumed completeness of markets and the absence of
cost of financial distress and taxes.
Following Mayers and Smith (1982), several explanations for hedging demand by corporations
have been put forward. One explanation is based on fiscal considerations. With a convex tax
schedule, Jensen’s inequality implies that expected taxes are reduced by hedging. The more
convex the eﬀective tax schedule, the greater is the reduction in expected taxes. Statutory
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progressivity, a common feature of systems, can cause convexity in the tax schedule. Smith and
Stulz (1985) make a similar argument.
Mac-Minn (1987) considers a model with costly bankruptcy. He argues that hedging reduces
the probability of the firm suﬀering financial distress by lowering the variance of firm value.
He then shows that hedging can eliminate or reduces bankruptcy costs in a argument similar to
Mayers and Smith (1982) and Smith and Stulz (1985). But in those models bankruptcy costs and
debt are exogenous. Caillaud, Dionne and Jullien (2000) address this issue using an extension of
Gale and Hellwig (1985). They consider two independent sources of risks that aﬀect the firm’s
return. They put their model in the costly state verification paradigm, that is, the outcome of
the risks is not costlessly observable by the lender. In such a framework, they derive the optimal
contract which can be decomposed into a bundle of a debt contract and an insurance contract
with franchise. The optimal contract trades-oﬀ between the two costly sources of audit.
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) consider that external sources of finance are more costly
than internal sources because capital markets are imperfect. They argue that hedging activity
shifts internal funds from excess cash states toward deficit states. In their model, hedging is
viewed as an instrument for coordinating corporate investment and financing policies. This
paper is the closest to our own. Our results follow their, but we endogenize the capital market
imperfections and what they call the investment opportunities. A paper in the same direction
is Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1999). Their capital market imperfection is related to asymmetric
information. A firm cannot pledge the entire net present value of its project to new investors.
They show that firms should be isolated from all shocks that can be costlessly hedged in capital
markets in order to reduce the variability in investment rules.
A diﬀerent line of research looks at issues related to agency costs within the firm. Stockholders
of a firm may have incentives to reject a positive net present value project if the benefits of the
project go to the bondholders. Hence, realizing that stockholders can behave opportunistically,
bondholders can protect themselves by lowering their oﬀer price. Moreover, problem of “debt
overhang” a` la Myers (1977) can exist. Mac-Minn (1987) shows how hedging or insurance can
eliminate or reduce such agency problems. A similar line is taken in Mac-Minn and Han (1990)
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and Mayers and Smith (1987). These motivations are not taken into consideration in this paper.
More recently, Grace and Rebello (1993) and Rebello (1995) studied a situation in which
firms have private information on its expected cash-flows and on its expected losses. They also
assume that firms with high operating revenues also face high insurable risks. In such a context,
hedging or insurance is viewed as a signal about the quality of the firm. Favorable information
is revealed by the purchase of high coverage.
5.2 Concluding remarks
In a situation where there is credit rationing, we have analyzed firms’ optimal hedging strategies.
We showed how hedging demand depends on the nature of interactions between firms and on
the correlation between shocks aﬀecting firms’ internal funds. This give us testable implications.
Knowing the nature of the interactions between firms, we could test if the hedging demand
increases or decreases when we go from the aggregated shocks case to the perfectly negatively
correlated shocks case. More precisely, in the case of strategic substitutes, it could be possible to
empirically test the theoretical results on some raw material market very concentrated (petrol,
nickel, ...), for which firms’ hedging demand can be correctly estimated by the size of their oﬀ
balance sheet positions.
Another question could be to know whether our results are still valid in other types of com-
petition between firms. In an oligopolistic case, firms’ interactions could change but still exist.
Thus, our results should be robust to this case.
In a competitive case, interactions between each firm tend to disappear. In this situation,
what matters should be the correlation between the amount of cash of one firm and the average
amount of cash of all other firms rather than the correlation between the amount of cash of
one firm and the amount of cash of another particular firm. It is, however, the scope of future
research to clarify these questions.
Finally, let us give two topics of future research which could generate a hedging demand for
a risk neutral entrepreneur. Taking into account the possibility of predation would lead a firm
to hedge against low income. Consider a situation where there are two firms on a market and
their products are substitutes. There is a rich incubent and an indebted entrant. If the entrant’s
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result is below a precise threshold, the entrant is liquidated. This context is favorable to an
incubent’s predation behavior which tries to eject the entrant out of the market. To avoid a too
aggressive incumbent behavior, and under the assumption that hedging contracts are observable,
even a risk neutral entrant can choose to hedge its result to avoid such predatory behavior.
Along another line, we could consider how mergers and acquisitions modify the nature of
investment opportunities. The resale price of a firm depends on whether or not there are buyers
standing by ready to purchase the firm. This depends on the extent to which other firms that
could be potential candidates to purchase the firm have accumulated the knowledge necessary to
manage the firm and have enough money to buy it. In a context of very specialized firms, when
there is an adverse aggregated shock at the level of the industry, the resale price of a firm inside
this industry will be very low. Indeed, the firms which have the necessary knowledge, that is,
firms in the same industry are then very poor. Therefore, if a firm has to be liquidated, its resale
price would be very low in this situation (cf: Shleifer and Vishny 1992). In such a context, firms
have an incentive to hedge their results against adverse aggregated shocks for two reasons. First,
to be able to buy at a low price another firm of the same industry which has to be liquidated.
Second, to avoid being liquidated at a very low price. In this context, we guess that the more a
firm hedges its result, the less other firms will hedge theirs.
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Appendix 1: study of the function πi (Ii, Ij)− Ii
We have to check that the function Vi = πi (Ii, Ij)− Ii with Ii, Ij defined by the two implicit
functions



πi (Ii, Ij)− Ii =
BIi
∆p
−Ai1
πj (Ij, Ii)− Ij =
BIj
∆p
−Aj1
is increasing, concave in Ai1 and that the cross derivative is negative when Ii, Ij are strategic
substitutes and positive when Ii, Ij are strategic complements.
14 We denote πi (Ii, Ij) by πi and
πj (Ii, Ij) by πj, to simplify the notations.
∂Vi
∂Ai1
=
µ
∂πi
∂Ii
− 1
¶
| {z }
> 0 by hypothesis
∂Ii
∂Ai1
+
∂πi
∂Ij
∂Ij
∂Ai1
We determine the sign of
∂Ii
∂Ai1
. We diﬀerentiate and resolve the system of the two implicit
equations.



∂πi
∂Ii
∂Ii
∂Ai1
+
∂πi
∂Ij
∂Ij
∂Ai1
− ∂Ii
∂Ai1
− B
∆p
∂Ii
∂Ai1
+ 1 = 0
∂πj
∂Ii
∂Ii
∂Ai1
+
·
∂πj
∂Ij
− 1− B
∆p
¸
∂Ij
∂Ai1
= 0
By resolving for
∂Ij
∂Ai1
=
∂πj
∂Ii
∂Ii
∂Ai1
1 + B∆p −
∂πj
∂Ij
we have:
∂Ii
∂Ai1
=
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πj
∂Ijµ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πi
∂Ii
¶µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πj
∂Ij
¶
− ∂πi
∂Ij
∂πj
∂Ii
The numerator is denoted N, the denominator D.
We suppose that the first cross derivatives of the two profit functions,
∂πi
∂Ij
and
∂πj
∂Ii
, are small.
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πi
∂Ii
and 1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πj
∂Ij
are positive (cf: figure 1). Thus,
∂Ii
∂Ai1
is positive.
14When Ii, Ij are strategic substitutes, we have,
∂2π(Ii,Ij)
∂Ii∂Ij < 0
When Ii, Ij are strategic complements, we have,
∂2π(Ii,Ij)
∂Ii∂Ij > 0
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The sign of
∂Ij
∂Ai1
corresponds to the sign of
∂πj
∂Ii
. Thus, the sign of
∂πi
∂Ij
∂Ij
∂Ai1
corresponds to
the sign of
∂πi
∂Ij
∂πj
∂Ii
, which is positive. Indeed,
∂πi
∂Ij
and
∂πj
∂Ii
have the same sign since the eﬀect
of Ij on πi and the eﬀect of Ii on πj, are the same.
Therefore, Vi is increasing in Ai1
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
≥ 0
¶
.
Since at the optimum, πi (Ii, Ij)− Ii =
BIi
∆p
−Ai1 we have:
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
=
B
∆p
∂2Ii
∂A2i1
The sign of this expression corresponds to the sign of
∂2Ii
∂A2i1
∂2Ii
∂A2i1
=
1
D2





∂2πj
∂Ij∂Ii
µ
−D +
µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πi
∂Ii
¶
N
¶
+N
∂2πi
∂I2i
µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πj
∂Ij
¶
+N
∂2πi
∂Ij∂Ii
∂πj
∂Ii
+N
∂πi
∂Ij
∂2πj
∂I2i


∂Ii
∂Ai1
+


∂2πj
∂I2j
µ
−D +
µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πi
∂Ii
¶
N
¶
+N
∂2πi
∂Ij∂Ii
µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πj
∂Ij
¶
+N
∂2πi
∂I2j
∂πj
∂Ii
+N
∂πi
∂Ij
∂2πj
∂Ij∂Ii


∂Ij
∂Ai1



For
∂2πj
∂Ij∂Ii
,
∂2πi
∂I2j
,
∂2πi
∂Ij∂Ii
,
∂2πj
∂I2j
,
∂2πj
∂I2i
bounded and
∂πj
∂Ii
,
∂πi
∂Ij
small enough, the sign of this
expression corresponds to the sign of
∂2πj
∂Ij∂Ii


−D +
µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πi
∂Ii
¶
N
=
∂πi
∂Ij
∂πj
∂Ii
small

+N
∂2πi
∂I2i
µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πj
∂Ij
¶
⇐⇒ N ∂
2πi
∂I2i
µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πj
∂Ij
¶2
≤ 0
The sign of
∂2Ii
∂A2i1
and the sign of
∂2πi
∂I2i
are the same. Consequently,
∂2Ii
∂A2i1
is negative. Thus,
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
is negative.
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∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
=
B
∆p
∂2Ii
∂Ai1∂Aj1
The sign of this expression corresponds to the sign of
∂2Ii
∂Ai1∂Aj1
∂2Ii
∂Ai1∂Aj1
=
1
D2







−D +N
µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πi
∂Ii
¶
=
∂πi
∂Ij
∂πj
∂Ii


∂2πj
∂I2j
+N
∂2πi
∂Ij∂Ii
µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πj
∂Ij
¶
+N
∂2πi
∂I2j
∂πj
∂Ii
+N
∂πi
∂Ij
∂2πj
∂Ij∂Ii


∂Ij
∂Aj1
+




−D +N
µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πi
∂Ii
¶
=
∂πi
∂Ij
∂πj
∂Ii


∂2πj
∂Ij∂Ii
+N
∂2πi
∂I2i
µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πj
∂Ij
¶
+N
∂2πi
∂Ij∂Ii
∂πj
∂Ii
+N
∂πi
∂Ij
∂2πj
∂I2i


∂Ii
∂Aj1



For
∂2πj
∂Ij∂Ii
,
∂2πi
∂I2j
,
∂2πi
∂Ij∂Ii
,
∂2πj
∂I2j
,
∂2πj
∂I2i
bounded and
∂πj
∂Ii
,
∂πi
∂Ij
small enough, the sign of this
expression is given by the sign of
N
µ
1 +
B
∆p
− ∂πj
∂Ij
¶
| {z }
≥ 0
∂2πi
∂Ij∂Ii
∂Ij
∂Aj1| {z }
≥ 0
In the strategic substitutes case,
∂2πi
∂Ij∂Ii
is negative.
∂2Ii
∂Ai1∂Aj1
is then negative as
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
.
In the strategic complements case,
∂2πi
∂Ij∂Ii
is positive.
∂2Ii
∂Ai1∂Aj1
is then positive as
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
Consequently, the function Vi = πi (Ii, Ij)−Ii with Ii, Ij defined by the system of two implicit
functions has the desired properties.
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Appendix 2: optimal hedging level
First of all, we are going to establish a useful lemma which we will use to obtain the optimal
hedging demand functions.
Lemma 3 Let (x, y) be a couple of random variables distributed according to a Bivariate Normal
law, with respective variance σ2x, σ
2
y and correlation coeﬃcient ρ.
Let b(x, y) : IR2 → IR continuously diﬀerentiable.
Then, for ρ ∈ {−1, 0, 1} we have:
cov(x; b(x, y)) = E
·
∂b(x, y)
∂x
+ ρ
σy
σx
∂b(x, y)
∂y
¸
σ2x
Proof. The Rubinstein (1976) rule is the following:
Let (x, y) be a couple of random variables distributed according to a Bivariate Normal law,
with respective variance σ2x, σ
2
y and correlation coeﬃcient ρ.
Let f(y): IR→ IR continuously diﬀerentiable
Then, cov(x; b(y)) = E
µ
∂b(y)
∂y
¶
cov(x; y)
The diﬀerence between the Rubinstein rule and our result comes from the function b(x,y). We
consider a function of two variables x and y and not a function of only one variable y.
case 1: x and y are perfectly correlated
Thus, x and y are linked by the following relation: x−E(x)
σx
= y−E(y)
σy
We could directly apply the Rubinstein rule to cov (x; b(x, y))
We obtain:
cov (x; b(x, y)) = Ex
·
∂b(x, y)
∂x
+
σy
σx
∂b(x, y)
∂y
¸
cov(x, x)
= Ex
·
∂b(x, y)
∂x
+
σy
σx
∂b(x, y)
∂y
¸
σ2x
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case 2: x and y are independent
In that case, there is no relation between x and y. We have to develop the covariance term.
cov (x; b(x, y)) = Ey
·Z
x
xb(x, y)f(x | y)dx− E(x)E(b(x, y) | y)
¸
= Ey
·
cov(x; b(x, y) | y)| {z }
term 1
+ (E(x | y)− E(x))E(b(x, y) | y)
i
We apply the Rubinstein rule to term 1 :
cov(x; b(x, y) | y) = Ex
µ
∂b(x, y)
∂x
| y
¶
cov(x;x | y)
= Ex
µ
∂b(x, y)
∂x
| y
¶
V ar(x | y)
= Ex
µ
∂b(x, y)
∂x
| y
¶
(1− ρ2)σ2x
Then, we use the fact that E(x | y) = E(x) + ρσx
σy
(y − E(y)).
Finally, we obtain:
cov (x; b(x, y)) = Ey
·
Ex
µ
∂b(x, y)
∂x
| y
¶
(1− ρ2)σ2x + ρ
σx
σy
(y − E(y))Ex(b(x, y) | y)
¸
= E
µ
∂b(x, y)
∂x
¶
(1− ρ2)σ2x + ρ
σx
σy
cov [y;Ex(b(x, y) | y)]
Since x and y are independent, ρ = 0. Thus, we obtain
cov (x; b(x, y)) = E
µ
∂b(x, y)
∂x
¶
σ2x
case 3: x and y are perfectly negatively correlated
In that case the link between x and y is: x−E(x)
σx
= −y−E(y)
σy
and we obtain:
cov (x; b(x, y)) = Ex
·
∂b(x, y)
∂x
− σy
σx
∂b(x, y)
∂y
¸
cov(x, x)
= Ex
·
∂b(x, y)
∂x
− σy
σx
∂b(x, y)
∂y
¸
σ2x
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By using the previous lemma we can determine the optimal hedging demand functions. The
entrepreneur chooses a hedging level which maximizes his expected utility with respect to hi.
max
hi
EVi
The first order condition is:
E
·
∂Vi
∂Ai1
∂Ai1
∂hi
¸
= 0
⇐⇒ E
·
∂Vi
∂Ai1
(Ai0(p− epi))¸ = 0
⇐⇒ −cov
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
; epi¶ = E · ∂Vi∂Ai1
¸
(Eepi − p)
We can note that −cov
³
∂Vi
∂Ai1
; epi´ is positive. We know from proposition 1, that ∂Vi∂Ai1 is
decreasing in Ai1. But, Ai1 is increasing in epi. Thus, when epi increases, Ai1 also increases, and
then ∂Vi
∂Ai1
decreases. The covariance between ∂Vi
∂Ai1
and epi is negative.
To develop the covariance term, we use lemma 3 in the diﬀerent cases under consideration.
case 1: epi and epj are perfectly correlated
The link between epi and epj is: epi − E (epi)σi = epj − E (epj)σj
By using the lemma 3, we have:
cov
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
, epi¶ = E ·∂2Vi∂A2i1 ∂Ai1∂epi + σjσi ∂
2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
∂Aj1
∂epj
¸
V ar(epi)
By replacing the covariance term in the expression
−cov
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
; epi¶− E · ∂Vi∂Ai1
¸
(Eepi − p) = 0 we have:
−E
·
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
∂Ai1
∂epi + σjσi ∂2Vi∂Ai1∂Aj1 ∂Aj1∂epj
¸
V ar(epi)− (Eepi − p)Eµ ∂Vi∂Ai1
¶
= 0
We know that:
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∂Ai1
∂epi = (1− hi)Ai0
and
∂Aj1
∂epj = (1− hj)Aj0
By substitution in the above expression, we obtain:
hi(hj) = 1 +
Aj0
Ai0
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶ σj
σi
(1− hj)
+
1
Ai0
E
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶Eepi − p
σ2i
case 2: epi and epj are independent
By using the lemma 3, we have:
cov
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
, epi¶ = E · ∂2Vi∂A2i1 ∂Ai1∂epi
¸
σ2i
By replacing the covariance term in the expression:
−cov
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
; epi¶− E · ∂Vi∂Ai1
¸
(Eepi − p) = 0 we have:
−E
·
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
∂Ai1
∂epi
¸
σ2i − (Eepi − p)Eµ ∂Vi∂Ai1
¶
= 0
We know that:
∂Ai1
∂epi = (1− hi)Ai0
By substitution in the above expression, we obtain:
hi(hj) = 1 +
1
Ai0
E
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶Eepi − p
σ2i
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case 3: epi and epj are perfectly negatively correlated
The link between epi and epj is: epi − E (epi)σi = −epj − E (epj)σj
By using the lemma 3, we have:
cov
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
, epi¶ = E ·∂2Vi∂A2i1 ∂Ai1∂epi − σjσi ∂
2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
∂Aj1
∂epj
¸
V ar(epi)
By replacing the covariance term in the expression :
−cov
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
; epi¶− E · ∂Vi∂Ai1
¸
(Eepi − p) = 0 we have:
−E
·
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
(1− hi)Ai0 −
σj
σi
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
(1− hj)Aj0
¸
V ar(epi)− (Eepi − p)Eµ ∂Vi∂Ai1
¶
= 0
By replacing in the above expression ∂Ai1
∂epi ∂Aj1∂epj by their respective value, we obtain hi(hj):
hi(hj) = 1−
Aj0
Ai0
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶ σj
σi
(1− hj)
+
1
Ai0
E
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶Eepi − p
σ2i
By using ρ, we have:
hi(hj) = 1 + ρ
Aj0
Ai0
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶ σj
σi
(1− hj)
+
1
Ai0
E
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶Eepi − p
σ2i
Appendix 3:
Since we consider a quadratic form for the value function Vi, we could write
Vi = cte+ aAi1 + bAj1 − cA2i1 − dAi1Aj1 − eA2j1
= cte+ aAi1 + bAj1 − c
µ
Ai1 +
d
c
Aj1
¶2
+ e0A2j1
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Firm i’s entrepreneur wants to maximize his expected income.
EVi = cte+ aEAi1 + bEAj1 − cE
µ
Ai1 +
d
c
Aj1
¶2
+ e0EA2j1
= cte+ aEAi1 + bEAj1 − c
µ
EAi1 +
d
c
EAj1
¶2
− cV ar
µ
Ai1 +
d
c
Aj1
¶
+ e0EA2j1
One term of the entrepreneur ’s hedging demand corresponds to the term which minimizes
V ar
¡
Ai1 +
d
c
Aj1
¢
with respect to hi.
To write the value function Vi, as we do above, we have to compute the second order limited
development of Vi. We find then, that d =
1
2
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
and c = 1
2
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
.
The first order condition with respect to the variance term is:
2A2i0(1− hi)σ2i = 2cov
Ã
Ai0 (p− epi) ; ∂2Vi∂Ai1∂Aj1∂2Vi
∂A2i1
Aj0 (phj + (1− hj) epj)!
After computations, we find that the solution for ρ ∈ {−1; 0; 1} is:
hi = 1 + ρ
Ai0
Aj0
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
σi
σj
(1− hj)
with ρ defined as the correlation coeﬃcient between epi and epj. This corresponds to the first term
of lemma 1.
Appendix 4: proof of proposition 2
From lemma 1, we know that for ρ ∈ {1, 0,−1}
hi(hj) = 1 + ρ
Aj0
Ai0
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶ σj
σi
(1− hj) +
1
Ai0
E
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶Eepi − p
σ2i
Assume hj given.
Consider the function f (hi) defined by:
f (hi) = hi −
1
Ai0
E
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶Eepi − p
σ2i
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df (hi)
dhi
= 1 +
(Eepi − p)2
σ2i
> 0
We see that f (hi) is increasing in hi.
For ρ = 1, f (hi) = 1+ a positive term
For ρ = 0, f (hi) = 1
For ρ = −1, f (hi) = 1+ a negative term
Thus, as f (hi) is increasing in hi for hj given, we have:
haggregated shocksi ≥ h
independent shocks
i ≥ h
perfectly negatively correlated shocks
i
Appendix 5: First results of comparative statics
1. When the variance of the spot price σ2i increases
By using the implicit function theorem, for σ2j given, we obtain the following
∂hi
∂σ2i
= −1
2
ρ
Aj0
Ai0
E ∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
E ∂2Vi
∂A2i1
σj
σ3i
(1− hj) Term A
− 1
Ai0
E ∂Vi
∂Ai1
E ∂2Vi
∂A2i1
Eepi − p
(σ2i )
2 Term B
Term A represents the eﬀect of σ2i on the interaction eﬀect. In the substitute case (in the
complement case), this term is negative (positive) for the aggregated shocks case, equals
to 0 for the independent shocks case and positive (negative) for the perfectly negatively
correlated shocks case.
Term B represents the eﬀect of σ2i on the risk premium eﬀect. This term is always positive.
2. When the firm i’s date 0 amount of cash Ai0 increases
By using the implicit function theorem, we obtain
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∂hi
∂Ai0
=
−
ρAj0E
³
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
´
σj (1− hj)
A2i0E
³
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
´
σi| {z }
Term A
−
³
1
Ai0
E ∂Vi
∂Ai1
− ∂2Vi
∂A2i1
(phi + (1− hi)Eepi)´ (Eepi − p)
Ai0E
³
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
´
σi| {z }
Term B
1+
(Eepi−p)2
σ2
i
Term A represents the eﬀect of Ai0 on the interaction eﬀect. In the substitute case (in
the complement case), term A is negative (positive) when shocks are aggregated, does not
exist in the independent shocks case and is positive (negative) when shocks are perfectly
negatively correlated.
Term B represents the eﬀect of Ai0 on the risk premium eﬀect. It is always positive.
3. When the firm j’s date 0 amount of cash Aj0 increases
By using the implicit function theorem, we obtain
∂hi
∂Aj0
³
1 + (Eepi−p)2
σ2i
´
=
ρE
³
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
´
σj
σi
(1− hj)
A2i0E
³
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
´
| {z }
Term A
+
³
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
(phj + (1− hj)Eepj)´ (Eepi−p)σi
Ai0E
³
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
´
| {z }
Term B
Term A represents the eﬀect of Aj0 on the interaction eﬀect. In the substitute case (in
the complement case), term A is positive (negative) when shocks are aggregated, does not
exist in the independent shocks case and is negative (positive) when shocks are perfectly
negatively correlated.
Term B represents the eﬀect of Aj0 on the risk premium eﬀect. It is positive for the
substitute case and negative for the complement case.
4. When the private benefit B of one entrepreneur increases
At the optimum, we have the following relationship
∂Vi
∂Ai1
=
B
∆P
∂Ii
∂Ai1
− 1
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Thus, at the optimum we have
∂hi
∂B
=
1
Ai0
1
∆P
∂Ii
∂Ai1
E ∂
2Vi
∂A2
i1
Eepi−p
σ2i
1 + (Eepi−p)2
σ2i
< 0
Under the assumptions taken for proposition 1, ∂Ii
∂Ai1
> 0. Therefore, ∂hi
∂B
< 0.
Appendix 6: evolution of firm i’s hedging demand with
respect to firm j’s hedging level
The computations for the substitute and the complement cases are the same, only their
interpretations change. Consequently, we distinguish the computations only for the diﬀerent
shocks we are interested in: aggregated shocks, independent shocks and perfectly negatively
correlated shocks. The distinction comes from the value of ρ.
We have:
hi(hj) = 1 + ρ
Aj0
Ai0
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶ σj
σi
(1− hj)
+
1
Ai0
E
µ
∂Vi
∂Ai1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶Eepi − p
σ2i
and thus,
∂hi(hj)
∂hj
= −ρAj0
Ai0
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶ σj
σi
+
1
Ai0
E
·
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
∂Ai1
∂hi
∂hi
∂hj
+
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
∂Aj1
∂hj
¸
1
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶Eepi − p
σ2i
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Since the value function Vi is quadratic, its second derivatives are constant. Thus,
∂hi(hj)
∂hj
could be written
∂hi
∂hj
"
1 +
(p− Eepi)2
σ2i
#
= −ρAj0
Ai0
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
¶
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶ σj
σi
− Aj0
Ai0
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶ (Eepj − p) (Eepi − p)
σ2i
Thus, for ρ = 1, we characterize the derivative expression for the aggregated shocks case.
For ρ = 0, we characterize the derivative expression for the independent shocks case.
For ρ = −1, we characterize the derivative expression for the perfectly negatively correlated
shocks case.
Therefore, we have characterized the derivative expression for all the cases we are interested
in.
Appendix 7: proof of proposition 6 and 7
Proof. We have:
• ∂hi
∂hj
≥ 0, for the aggregated shocks and independent shocks cases
• for the perfectly negatively correlated shocks case, ∂hi
∂hj
could be positive or negative
• haggregated shocksi (0) < hindependant shocksi (0) < hperfectly negatively correlated shocksi (0)
• haggregated shocksi (1) = hindependant shocksi (1) = hperfectly negatively correlated shocksi (1) < 1
• the reaction functions are linear
• we make the implicit assumption that
¯¯¯¯
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂Ai1∂Aj1
¶¯¯¯¯
<
¯¯¯¯
E
µ
∂2Vi
∂A2i1
¶¯¯¯¯
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We distinguish two cases:
First case:
∂hi
∂hj
≥ 0, ∀ρ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
thus we have:
figure 3a
The symmetric Nash equilibria are unique and respect the proposition 6
Second case:
∂hi
∂hj
≥ 0 for the aggregated shocks and independent shocks cases and ∂hi
∂hj
≤ 0
for the perfectly negatively correlated shocks case
figure 3b
As shown in the figure 3b, the symmetric Nash equilibria are unique and respect proposition
7.
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